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ABSTRACT 
The 1960s bequeathed to incoming generations of Americans a world 
in which neoconservatism became the intellectual spearhead of 
rightwing political thought and action. To this day, politics and 
policy making retain a potent neoconservative flair, which must be 
added to the considerable vigor of neoconservative principles in the 
enduring cultural wars still coloring American public life. This article 
reassesses the origins of neoconservatism and examines the key 
elements and subsequent influence of this group of American 
rightwing thinkers and policy makers. 
RESUMEN 
La década de los años 1960 ha legado a las subsiguientes 
generaciones de estadounidenses un mundo en el que el 
neoconservadurismo se ha convertido en la punta de lanza 
intelectual del pensamiento y la acción política de la derecha 
norteamericana. Desde entonces hasta la actualidad, tanto la 
política como las iniciativas de gestión pública en la Gran República 
han retenido una potente connotación neoconservadora que debe 
añadirse, además, al considerable vigor de los principios 
                                                 
1 This article has been possible thanks to assistance received from the MECD-backed 
research project  HAR2015-68492-P as well as grants received from the  Department 
of History, Sheffield University, the Royal Historical Society, The Guilder Lehrman 
Institute for American History and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation. 
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neoconservadores en las duraderas guerras culturales que aún se 
libran en la vida pública estadounidense. Este artículo re-evalúa los 
orígenes del neoconservadurismo y examina los elementos clave del 
mismo, así como la influencia subsecuente de este grupo de 
pensadores y gestores públicos asociados a la derecha política. 
 
Fifty years ago New York construction workers violently burst 
into the city’s streets in support of Richard Nixon’s Vietnam policy 
and, crucially, to battle against activists of the anti-war movement 
while shouting “USA all the way” and recommending their youthful 
opponents to either “love it or leave it” (Perlstein, 493-495). The event 
is relevant because it both eerily echoes the language employed half 
a century later by President Trump when he suggested that four 
congresswomen whom he judged insufficiently patriotic –and who 
happened to be of non-white descent– should also leave the country. 
Moreover, those events also help to underline the frequently 
overlooked populist aspects of the rightwing reaction against the set 
of countercultural values commonly associated with the 1960s 
(Hijiya 201-227). The objective of this article is, precisely, to 
contribute towards the growing body of literature acknowledging that 
the 1960s were marked by the growth and development of American 
conservatism as much as by the better known developments on the 
left of the political spectrum and, therefore, towards a reassessment 
of the 1960s as a whole and of the decade’s subsequent effects upon 
the culture and politics of present-day United States.2  In this sense, 
the most lasting effect of the 1960s upon the American right was the 
emergence of two new members in the conservative family: the 
populist New Right and the neoconservatives. The continuities 
between the former and the populist revival evident in the politics 
                                                 
2 There is a significant and coherent body of literature examining the rise of the early 
conservative movement. See Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up: A 
History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America. Houghton Mifflin, 1996; Sidney 
Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to 
Political Power. Times Books, 1986; José María Marco, La Nueva Revolución 
Americana. Ciudadela, 2007; John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right 
Nation: Conservative Power in America. Penguin, 2004; Jerome L. Himmelstein, To the 
Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism. University of California Press, 
1990. The existing literature has also been enriched by “in-house” conservative 
accounts, such as Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That 
Remade America. Free Press, 1999; William Rusher, The Rise of the Right. William 
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985. 
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and presidency of Donald Trump through the emergence of the Tea 
Party are evident and demand a full examination in their own right  – 
most notably rightwing populism’s incarnation in George Wallace, 
the Alabama governor who ran an independent presidential 
campaign under the rather tantalizing slogan, with post-2016 
hindsight, “Stand Up for America” (see for instance Carter, 324-70; 
Berlet and Lyons 228-247; Kazin; Rosenthal and Trost 305-323; 
Kranish and Fisher 309-349). These pages, however, aim at 
evaluating the 60’s as the opening of a new epoch for the American 
right through an analysis of the origins of neoconservatism, which is 
less obviously connected with but equally crucial to current cultural 
and political developments.  
 This analysis is not only timely because we are now 
witnessing a resurgence of rightwing political energy in the United 
States, but also because of the notable confusion that surrounds the 
character of the neoconservative brand of American conservatism 
despite the presence of some early and rather informative scholarly 
work (Ehrman; Steinfels; Heillbrunn). In a process that intensified in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the term 
“neoconservative” has acquired a peculiar meaning in the public 
mind after it has been used, often as a term of abuse, to define one 
given way of conducting foreign policy which journalists and opinion 
makers, as well as otherwise quite sound scholarly work (see for 
instance Diamond 178-204; Blumenthal ix-xix), have tended to 
associate with a sort of dark, rightwing clique headed by President 
George W. Bush. In alternative readings, even the former president 
was the feckless hostage of this, now emphatically dark and 
decidedly corrupt, faction of the right led by Dick Cheney, as 
suggested in Michael Moore’s 2004 documentary Fahrenheit 9/11, 
Adam McKay’s 2018 film Vice and, implicitly but not very subtly, in 
Jonathan Demme’s remake of The Manchurian Candidate, released, 
not coincidentally, almost simultaneously with Michael Moore’s blast 
at the Bush Administration and amidst the rising tension caused by 
the then spiraling out of control occupation of Iraq. A cabal, in any 
case, both corrupt in its willingness to put the federal institutions at 
the service of private interests and malignant in its determination to 
deal with the international affairs of the Republic through invading, 
or at the very least bombing, the adversary (Halper and Clarke, 
specially 13-16, 273-295).  
 Perhaps not surprisingly, the latest and quite illustrative 
iteration of this brand of rather superficial analysis has focused on 
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the figures of John Bolton, Donald Trump’s admittedly hawkish 
National Security Advisor between April 2018 and September 2019, 
and Special Envoy to Venezuela Elliot Abrams. Little surprise also 
when, given the atmosphere surrounding neoconservatism, one finds 
a panic-stricken op-ed piece in USA Today by former army captain 
Michael Morford warning that “the neocons are back” and graphically 
entitled “John Bolton is Trying to Steer Us Into Another Mideast 
War” or when one finds, in the pages of the Washington Post, a barely 
more sober piece by college professor Brian D’Haeseleer  graphically 
entitled “How the Neocons Captured Donald Trump.” Even before the 
above appointments had been announced and at a time when The 
Weekly Standard, the then main publication of neoconservative 
opinion, had closed down after strenuous and consistent 
neoconservative opposition to the candidacy of Donald Trump 
throughout the 2016 electoral season, Rolling Stone, not exactly 
supporters of Trump’s presidency either, managed to connect the 
dastardly neocons with the Trump White House in Matt Taibbi’s 
“Return of the Neocons!” (exclamation mark in the original). More 
revealingly, the on-line magazine Politico received the appointment of 
Abrams with the headline “Elliot Abrams, prominent DC Neocon 
Special Envoy to Venezuela.” Tellingly enough Politico, yet again not 
suspicious of Trumpite affinities, chose to underline the appointee’s 
bone fide status as both a Washington insider and as a 
neoconservative rather than, say, Abram’s guilt during the Iran-
Contra scandal, and therefore prioritized giving the lie to Donald 
Trump’s oft repeated platitudes against the elite politicians 
supposedly festering in “the swamp” within the Beltway. Quite 
correctly so, however, for neoconservatism as a political movement 
within the American right has consciously sought to operate at the 
level of political and intellectual elites, while consistently disdaining 
the creation of a mass following (Dorrien 8-17); to say nothing of the 
obvious inconsistency between the aggressive, interventionist 
leanings of both Bolton and some (but not all, see for instance 
Kirkpatrick 303-305) neocons, and the isolationist instincts –one has 
to hesitate to speak of “convictions,” never mind “ideas”– of President 
Trump as in, for instance, his consistent pre-presidential criticism of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Trump, “How I’d Run the Country 
(Better)”) and his abundantly expressed impatience with the 
continued presence of US troops in both the latter theatre and the 
Middle East, including the serious, albeit apparently shambolic  
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attempt at unilateral withdrawal from Syria  (Wright, “Syria a 
Withdrawal or a Surrender?”). 
Yet, the popular perception bears scant relation to 
neoconservatives as both a historically relevant and politically 
influential group within the American conservative family and 
contains seriously problematic assumptions about their relationship 
with the brand of rightwing politics and ideas to which Donald 
Trump has attached himself. As the following pages show, the 
connection between Donald Trump’s brand of rightwing proposals 
and the neoconservatives’ is real and significant, albeit indirect and 
belonging to the realm of ideas rather than to specific individuals or 
articulated through concrete organizational links. Crucially, it does 
not lie in foreign policy, but in certain conservative populist premises 
which have their main impact on domestic affairs and from which 
attitudes about foreign affairs –some them indeed shared by both 
neoconservatives and otherwise isolationist rightwing populists in 
Trump’s fashion– ultimately derive.  
 This essay re-examines the political science and journalistic 
literature as well as the works of neoconservatives themselves to 
show how the first wave of neoconservative thinkers and opinion 
makers emerged as a political reality during the mid-1960s around 
two particular journals –The Public Interest and Commentary which, 
crucially, acted in reaction to the perceived ravages of the 
counterculture against previously accepted cultural axioms. It 
cannot be emphasized enough that the center of gravity of that early 
neoconservative message was thoroughly uninterested in foreign 
affairs and was located within a particular analysis of domestic 
issues that emphasized the cultural welfare of the nation. Equally 
important, the ideological foundations of neoconservatism were not 
necessarily located in and certainly did not originate within the 
spectrum of the political right. This is relevant because 
neoconservatives took considerable pride in their capacity to attack 
the 1960’s New Left from within and therefore, again, offering a hint 
of the apparent contradictions of ongoing political and cultural 
debates in the United States.  
 
NECONSERVATISM AND THE INHERITANCE OF THE 1960S 
 
Broadly speaking, this decade-long period of turbulent 
change spanned from the passing of the 1963 Civil Rights Act to the 
legalization of abortion through the Supreme Court decision in Roe v 
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Wade in 1973. In those ten years, four separate but intimately 
connected issues transformed American political life beyond 
recognition, and would eventually trigger the emergence of a 
conservative “revival and reaction”: African-Americans’ struggle for 
meaningful equality; the irruption of the women’s liberation 
movement; President Lyndon Johnson’s push for social democratic-
leaning reforms under the umbrella of the Great Society, and the 
emergence of an increasingly vocal anti-Vietnam War movement 
(Graham; Peel).  
Up until 1963, the Civil Rights movement had focused on 
bringing an end to legally mandated discrimination against blacks in 
the South and had relied upon a rigorously non-violent strategy to 
achieve that end. However, the following two years saw the passage 
of civil rights and voting rights legislation accompanied by violent 
race riots in northern cities, such as in Harlem and Brooklyn in 
1963, and again in New York in 1964 as well as in Philadelphia in 
1964. This unrest quickly expanded to the west, such as the 
infamous Watts, L. A. riots of 1965, and to the rest of the country, 
such as the riots in Baltimore, Seattle, Newark, Atlanta and Oakland 
in 1966 and 1967 (Perlstein b, xx). As the movement leaned towards 
violence, its expansion beyond the segregated South also brought a 
qualitative change of objectives: from the ending of de jure 
discrimination below the Mason-Dixon Line towards demanding 
positive intervention on the part of federal authorities to achieve 
socioeconomic equality for African Americans throughout the nation. 
To put it in the terms used in those years, African-Americans moved 
from demanding equality of opportunity to calling for “equality of 
results” (Graham 455-457).  
 As has been abundantly demonstrated by the literature, the 
cultural and political scenario created between Lyndon Johnson’s 
victory in 1964 and Richard Nixon’s re-election of 1972 has remained 
notoriously stable up until today. Both the persistent, clearly 
structural reality of racial discrimination and the disruptive reaction 
of the African American community clearly links the actions of the 
less accommodationist black activists of the 1960s, such as Stokeley 
Carmichael or the violent riots of that age with the recent activities of 
#blacklivesmatter and the disturbances that periodically follow 
instances of racially loaded police brutality (Edsall; Lassiter). 
 In the second place, at the same time that the Civil Rights 
movement evolved, President Lyndon Johnson pushed a broad 
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number of measures usually known as the “Great Society” aimed at 
improving the welfare of the less-favored (including many blacks) 
through federal programs. With the energy of a massive electoral 
victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964 and favored by a long period of 
near-uninterrupted economic expansion, the Johnson White House 
assumed new responsibilities in areas as varied as environmental 
conservation, consumer protection, and provision of medical 
assistance for the poor and the elderly. However, in less than four 
years the high expectations aroused by the Great Society had been 
met by a relative lack of success (despite the absolute rise in costs) 
and a deteriorating –albeit not yet as alarming as in the early 1970’s 
– economic situation. (Stein; Matusow; Sarias). As was the case with 
Civil Rights, the debates around the federal government’s 
responsibilities regarding the provision of welfare and, perhaps more 
importantly, the terms in which the debate took place during those 
crucial years, have remained “a fixed part of the American 
experience” up until the present day (Dallek, 374). After half a 
century both major parties are still, for instance, discussing the 
obligations of the federal authorities toward the supply of medical 
care against the demands of fiscal responsibility. It is no accident 
that the presidency of Barack Obama and the ascendancy of the Tea 
Party (Skocpol and Williamson 56, 171-177), as well as the 
presidential campaigns of 2016 and the primary season of 2019, 
have been dominated by whether and how to expand Medicare and 
Medicaid, both passed under Lyndon Johnson, “for all” (Dallek 196-
201; Rosenthal; Uhrmacher et al.).  
 The third central element of civil discord during the second 
half of the 1960s was the growing opposition to the war in South 
East Asia, which galvanized students (mostly white and from middle-
class backgrounds) in the universities towards a rebellious spiral 
that quickly passed from more or less peaceful protests on campuses 
throughout the nation, to violence and even terrorism on the part of 
a tiny minority, such as the famous Weather Underground (McGuirr 
225-237; Micklethwait and Adrian Woodridge 64-68; Bell 88-89). 
Needless to say, the experience of anti-war dissent at home and of 
over-ambitious military missions abroad –the so-called “Vietnam 
syndrome’– which never quite left the American public consciousness 
once it had emerged during the second half of the 1960s (the best 
contemporary accounts remain Halberstam; Heller) has remained a 
central aspect of American politics as the war in Afghanistan 
remains an open-ended drain of American material, human and 
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emotional resources. That neoconservative foreign policy 
aggressiveness and the influence of neoconservative advisors upon 
hapless presidents has been near-universally emphasized and is yet 
another element of continuity (see for instance Halper and Clarke). 
So much so, in fact, that Gordon Golstein’s Lessons in Disaster, 
analyzing the inglorious war in South East Asia, remained a prime 
source of analysis for Obama’s advisors (Woodward 129-130, 154) 
while that war was also the object of Trump’s first National Security 
Advisor H.R. McMaster’s PhD dissertation, subsequently published 
under the title Dereliction of Duty. No wonder, then, that President 
Trump remains consistent in his promises of foreign 
disentanglement despite his otherwise erratic political outlook (see 
for instance Kube and Lee). 
 These three elements combined with rise of the women’s 
liberation movement and changing sexual mores –not least, but not 
only among the young– which fostered the expansion of the 
counterculture beyond its narrow New York intellectual circles in 
parallel to the emergence of the political New Left. During these 
years, according to neoconservatives  –who conflated all of the above 
with developments such as rising inflation in a single countercultural 
phenomenon– the liberal (in the American sense of the term) 
intelligentsia installed in the universities and the mass media also 
underwent a process of radicalization akin to the experience of 
blacks and the young. Intellectuals such as Norman Mailer, Barbara 
Gerson and Jack Kerouac, together with the rest of the beat 
generation, articulated a set of views soon to be known as the 
“counterculture.” Neoconservatives agreed that the atmosphere 
created by the dissatisfaction of African Americans and young 
women, and later on the gay community, together with the 
incapacity of the state to bring an end to poverty, and the brutalities 
committed in Vietnam, drove a growing number of intellectuals and 
leaders of opinion toward questioning not just the policies of the 
Johnson administration, but the very validity of received axioms at 
the heart of American society and politics (see for instance Kristol 
54-74, particularly the brutal, even by the standards of the day, 
moralizing about the AIDS epidemic and homosexuality 63-67).   
 From the neoconservative perspective, all of a sudden and as 
Daniel Bell (then still a liberal but already moving towards a position 
friendly towards what would later be known as neo-conservatism) 
put it, the “New Left” (meaning the New Left, the Counterculture and 
assorted activists) had engaged in a “total” revolution of society, 
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starting with traditional mores about family life, sexual behavior and 
established authority, which were critically examined and found 
inadequate by what neoconservatives firmly believed were a minority 
of self-styled avant-garde intellectuals, who sought to spread their 
ideas through the mainstream mass media, the expanding body of 
university students and the nation at large (Bell 99; Kristol 116- 122; 
Cadushin 109-126). The connection between these early 
neoconservative assumptions and the persistence of the culture 
wars, particularly with regards to gender issues and, more recently, 
sexual orientation –including its evolution into debates about sexual 
identity that still remain too recent for adequate academic digestion– 
as well as its crystallization in the absolutely central role it occupies 
within Donald Trump’s 21st-century version of rightwing populism 
hardly requires illustration: the brutally misogynistic treatment of 
Hillary Clinton’s gender –as in, for instance, the thinly veiled 
reference to menstruation during the presidential debates (“Trump 
Mocks Clinton for Taking Toilet Break During Democratic Debate– 
Video”)– and with regards to journalist Mika Berzezinsky, combined 
with Trump’s consistent attacks on racial minorities (“‘Drug dealers, 
criminals, rapists’: What Trump thinks of Mexicans”), as well as the 
reluctance to expand federally provided healthcare to, among others, 
those very same minorities, are neither original nor particularly 
imaginative tropes: neoconservatives had already begun to develop 
them during the 1960s. 
 The rapid cultural changes unleashed during the 1960s 
formed the milieu within which neoconservatism formed. In this 
sense it is paramount to note that all early neoconservatives had 
belonged to the liberal intelligentsia associated with the Democratic 
Party and progressive liberalism. The “neo” in “neoconservative” 
refers to individuals who ended up joining the conservative ranks 
during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. According to the 
neoconservative self-image, this fracture within liberalism and the 
neoconservatives’ own collective road to Damascus was not triggered 
by their own shift to the right, but by the drift of their fellow liberal 
intellectuals toward the counterculture and the New Left. Indeed, 
these men and women continued to cling to a number of ideas 
previously accepted as part of the post-1945 liberal consensus and 
quite at variance with the proposals of other families of the American 
right, including the then dominant “hard core” conservatives 
gathered around the weekly National Review and galvanized during 
the 1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater. Norman 
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Podhoretz and Irving Kristol, the two most prominent early 
neoconservatives, have been particularly clear about this aspect of 
their political evolution. Kristol, often termed the “godfather” of the 
neoconservatives, has been keen to emphasize that neoconservative 
“dissidence” from liberalism “accelerated” as a direct consequence of 
the counterculture and as “the spectrum of liberalism became even 
narrower” and “even more dogmatically left-leaning” (Blumenthal; 
Kristol, x-xi). Norman Podhoretz, Kristol’s fellow-traveler and long-
time editor of the prestigious cultural journal Commentary labelled 
himself a “centrist,” and has always explained his abandonment of 
the liberal-progressive ship as a consequence of the New Left 
triumph. In his memoirs, Podhoretz explained how American 
progressivism had sustained itself as a force “against radicalism” up 
until the 1960’s, when it became “captured” by new left “radicals” 
(Podhoretz 16).  
 Podhoretz and Kristol were certainly not alone. However, it 
would be a mistake to believe that all who were associated with 
neoconservatism necessarily agreed on most issues, or even that 
neoconservatism possessed in any way a fixed set of principles to 
which all neoconservatives subscribed. On the contrary, they 
engaged in remarkably lively public policy and political debates and 
their individual views have varied over time. Kristol, for instance, 
likes to say that he has been “moving consistently to the right” and 
admits to considerable inconsistencies in his views over the long-
term (Kristol ix). One of the most frequent collaborators with these 
journals, the philosopher Sydney Hook, continued to label himself as 
a “socialist,” no less, even after actively collaborating with the Nixon 
White House’s efforts against the student New Left (Baroody 
memorandum to Colson). Similarly, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a young 
Democrat until the early 1970’s, recalled that she was “puzzled” 
when she was first labelled a “neoconservative” since she had never 
seen herself as a conservative, neither new nor of any other sort 
(Kirkpatrick “Neoconservatism” 235; Keene). Another member of the 
group, sociologist Nathan Glazer was, as early as 1971, particularly 
clear when in a famous article published in Commentary, he pointed 
out that the culture wars did not set conservatives against liberals, 
who shared certain basic values with one another, but pitted both 
groups against the “radicals” of the New Left who “wanted to change 
everything by revolutionary means.”  Nevertheless, Glazer remained a 
steadfast supporter of the New Deal and, according to an active 
conservative Republican activist of those years, “probably never voted 
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Republican” (Bell; Podhoretz b). But then again, it is undeniable that 
a relatively cohesive group of thinkers and academics coalesced 
between 1965 and 1968 around The Public Interest, edited by Kristol, 
and Commentary edited by Podhoretz. 
   Thus, it is no accident that Podhoretz would entitle his 
memoirs Breaking Ranks. Neoconservatives, disgusted by the 
counterculture and the attitude of their fellow liberals (or “old 
friends’, as Podhoretz put it), found themselves increasingly on the 
conservative side of political debate, often after a personal catharsis 
which was, as in Kirkpatrick’s case, long drawn out, and sometimes, 
as in Sydney Hook’s and Nathan Glazer’s cases, life-long (Podhoretz 
3-17; Keene; Bell; Blackwell; Rusher, Rise). The most important 
elements of neoconservatism follow quite closely the cleavage that 
erupted within American society itself: first a series of ethical and 
moral arguments aimed at preserving certain traditional values – 
notably about gender and race– from the culture wars of the 1960’s 
and 70’s. From the foregoing analysis stemmed the second aspect, 
which consisted of a set of technocratic recipes aimed at correcting 
the perceived mistakes of the Great Society in areas ranging from 
Civil Rights to welfare assistance and education. An article written by 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick after the 1972 presidential campaign abstracted 
quite graphically the main moral tenets that have guided 
neoconservatives ever since. According to Kirkpatrick, the 1960’s had 
unleashed a “cultural revolution” which would ultimately come to a 
head in the 1972 clash between Richard Nixon, who was by then 
running under a conservative or at least explicitly anti-New Left 
banner, and George McGovern, who had captured the Democratic 
nomination with an anti-war, New Left-leaning platform.  McGovern 
was, in Kirkpatrick’s eyes, the “candidate of the counterculture” and 
of the “Triple A: Acid, Amnesty and Abortion” (Kirkpatrick c 58-62) 
The Democratic candidate certainly become the bête noire of an 
increasingly restless group of still-Democratic stalwarts: if Richard 
Nixon’s victory in 1968 marked the beginning of a consistent shift to 
the right in presidential politics, McGovern’s nomination in 1972 
highlighted, at least according to neoconservatives, the corrosion of 
the Democratic Party which, according to them, had started with the 
candidacy of Eugene McCarthy in 1968. In Kristol’s view, McGovern’s 
candidacy “sent us a message that we were now off the liberal 
spectrum” (Kristol 32; Podhoretz 343-344).  
  Kirkpatrick’s “Acid” and “Abortion” represented the 
neoconservatives’ hostility towards new sexual and gender mores 
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that they interpreted as a crisis of values caused by of the rampant 
“hedonism” of the 1960’s, which was also reflected in the expansion 
of the recreational use of drugs such as marijuana and LSD. This, of 
course, has since become a key conservative trope that emerged and 
re-emerged later on: to deal with the heroin epidemic of the 1970s, 
the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and 90s and the ongoing opioid 
epidemic (Kristol 54-74; Rothman; French). To neoconservatives, that 
hedonism had its roots in the “shallow, escapist” and “simplistic” 
attitude of the “new sensibility” manifested during the decade by 
some of their fellow intellectuals (Dickstein 66). Still worse, 
neoconservatives believed that the cultural zeitgeist of intellectuals’ 
irresponsibility eventually translated itself into a widespread 
challenge to any form of established authority, ranging from basic 
norms of courtesy to the collapse of academic standards and 
repeated instances of public disorders. As early as 1968 Nathan 
Glazer described student protesters as “luddite machine smashers” 
bent on a “scorched earth policy against the universities” (Glazer 20). 
Hedonism was also closely related to the demise of “Victorian values” 
which had resulted from the “sexual liberation movement”– equally 
deplored by neoconservatives (Sisk). In 1972, when Kirkpatrick was 
writing, abortion was not yet legalized but neoconservatives were 
already convinced that the counterculture, aided by medical 
developments such as the pill, was in the process of destroying the 
norms that had traditionally regulated family life and sexual 
practices. “Free love” and some radical forms of feminism had 
posited the family as an oppressive institution designed to repress 
individual freedom generally and in particular that of women and the 
young. Against the traditional family, the counterculture offered 
alternative models which went from hippie communes to, at least 
since the New York Stonewall Riots of 1969, a defense of gay family 
models. Under the epigraph of “abortion,” Kirkpatrick gathered a 
vigorous defense of traditional values regarding family and sex, 
which neoconservatives saw as the roots of “Western civilization,” 
and which would subsequently lead them to propose increasingly 
drastic measures such as censorship of pornography and the return 
of women to the “true freedom” of the domestic sphere snatched from 
them by radical feminism (Thompson 58; Kristol ; Decter 44, 45). 
 When Kirkpatrick mentioned “Amnesty” as the second of the 
“triple A’s,” she explicitly deplored McGovern’s intention to pardon 
the dozens of young students who had chosen to escape the draft 
and the Vietnam War. Although Kirkpatrick articulated a vigorous 
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defense of patriotism, this position should not be conflated with the 
foreign-policy hawkishness often displayed by neoconservative 
spokespeople. Firstly, Kirkpatrick was rather continuing with the 
Democratic Cold War stance that had guided presidents Truman, 
Kennedy and Johnson, and which would be maintained during the 
early 1970’s by men such as Kirkpatrick’s mentor, Democratic 
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (Phillips; Seltzer 22-23; Moynihan 
38-39)  Neoconservatives took pains to emphasize that despite the 
flirtations with communism of prominent liberal figures, such as 
infamous FDR staffer-cum-Soviet spy Alger Hiss or former Vice-
President Henry Wallace, most progressives from the late 1940s to 
the 1960s had remained firmly within the vigorously patriotic anti-
communist consensus. Secondly, virtually all neoconservatives were 
reacting against the Vietnam-induced New Left critique of American 
society. After the Tet offensive of 1968, individuals such as Podhoretz 
and Kristol freely admitted that the war in South East Asia “didn’t 
work,” had been a terrible mistake and was quite possibly 
irremediably lost, but they flatly refused to admit that, as the 
counterculture claimed, the horrors of Vietnam were a symptom of 
the moral bankruptcy of the United States’ social and cultural 
backbone. It was post-McGovern Democrats, neoconservatives 
argued, who were reverting to isolationism as a consequence of their 
lack of faith in American (or Western) civilization. As Norman 
Podhoretz asserted, neoconservatives were not in favor of the war, 
but “against the movement against the war” (Podhoretz b). In other 
words, patriotism against a clique of treacherous intellectuals 
became a central element –together with traditional morality and a 
controlled but market friendly economy– of the neoconservative 
canon. Needless to say, when Donald Trump repeatedly labels –not 
least in the State of the Union address– “liberals” as “un-American” 
and quite possibly “treasonous,” he is merely reproducing this anti-
elitist trope aimed at that liberal elite installed in the media and the 
universities as well as in large corporations (McLaughlin). 
 Of course, in the neoconservative vision that liberal elite is 
also installed in government. A further and frequently forgotten 
aspect of neoconservatism was its technocratic character, for one of 
the distinctive characteristics of neoconservatives has been their 
remarkable ability to produce specific public-policy proposals. In 
fact, the first publication clearly identifiable as neoconservative, The 
Public Interest, was exclusively devoted to the analysis and proposal 
of domestic policy-making initiatives. Its pages gathered the work of 
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those such as politician Daniel Patrick Moynihan, sociologist Nathan 
Glazer and public policy professor-cum-political scientist James Q. 
Wilson. The personal trajectories of Moynihan and Wilson are both 
good examples of technocratic neoconservatism. Both men had left 
academic life to work within Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, Wilson 
in crime prevention and Moynihan in race-related issues and the 
fight against poverty; both suffered a similar disenchantment with 
the lack of apparent improvement and the violent fashion in which 
the poor, and particularly African-Americans, seemed to be venting 
their frustration (Moynihan’s own home was attacked by radicals); 
and both wound up working for Richard Nixon, espousing proposals 
highly critical of what they interpreted as liberal “softness” towards 
delinquency and favoring a greater emphasis on “individual 
responsibility” and “self-reliance” (Hodgson 123-126; Wilson 71-78). 
The path followed by these two men does, at any rate, reflect quite 
nicely the neoconservatives’ proximity to power and the crucial part 
played by the decade between 1963 and 1973. 
 What neoconservatives perceived as the excesses of the Great 
Society drove these men toward the basic conclusions that would 
distinguish neoconservatives from both liberal-progressives (social 
democrats in European terms) and traditional American 
conservatives of the National Review/Barry Goldwater variety. 
Firstly, since the late 1960’s, neoconservatives adopted certain, but 
not all, of the anti-statist, laissez-faire theses developed by 
neoclassical liberals such as Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek 
and Henry Hazlitt and enthusiastically espoused by the likes of 
Goldwater. Thus, neoconservatives accepted that state action could 
not solve all problems and that in some cases public policy actually 
worsened the situation, but unlike the neoliberals, neoconservatives 
always remained stubborn supporters of the New Deal, which they 
contrasted to the excesses of the Great Society, and granted a 
relatively large role to the state in assisting the needy (Podhoretz b).3 
Civil Rights was a case in point during the late 1960’s. During his 
years within the Johnson Administration, Moynihan used the 
statistics of the Department of Labor to demonstrate that one of the 
                                                 
3 One of the most recent examples has been the confrontation between the 
neoconservative-leaning “compassionate conservatism” adopted by the Bush Jr., 
administration and neoliberalism, illustrated in the political memoir of George W. 
Bush staffer Michael Gerson, Heroic Conservatism. Why Republicans Need to Embrace 
America's Ideals (And Why They Deserve to Fail If They Don't). HarperCollins, 2007. 
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main obstacles to the emergence of a black middle-class was, of all 
things, government assistance to single-parent families. According to 
Moynihan, financial subsidies to single mothers had the “unintended 
effect” of stimulating the breakup of the family unit because they 
favored the “expulsion of the man” (Moynihan b). Hence, a measure 
designed to provide short-term support for the poor actually 
contributed to the creation of long-term damage by trapping poor 
blacks in a cycle of broken families. Of course, Civil Rights 
supporters quipped that Moynihan, who advised a period of “benign 
neglect” on the part of the Federal government, was effectively 
blaming the victims –that is, African American families; today one 
would add women and mothers to boot– for their plight while 
advising the Federal government to retreat from further action 
(Hodgson 157‒5; Baroody memorandum to Colson; Moynihan Coping 
208-209). Looking at current American politics, it is not difficult to 
find the exact same debate being reproduced in the exact same terms 
between Trump and his critics (Rubin; Khan and Cook). Except in 
this case, the racially loaded blame-the-victim politics are not 
accompanied by anything resembling the neoconservative’s policy-
analysis sophistication.  
 A second, but perhaps most crucial “unexpected effect” in 
Moynihan’s assessment was the emergence of a “new class” made up 
of the bureaucrats necessary to design and manage government 
policy. According to the neoconservative critique this new 
bureaucracy, however well meaning, would soon become more 
concerned with protecting its own interests than those of its 
supposed protégées. Not only that; neoconservatives were also quick 
to note that civil servants working for the welfare state were mostly 
white middle-class graduates from the same universities dominated 
by New Left “radical” academics. It was no accident, neoconservatives 
claimed, that the main bastion of radicalism was also the place that 
produced the personnel that manned the large bureaucracies it 
defended. As Kristol argued, the American working class was 
actually “far less consumed with egalitarian bitterness or envy than 
are college professors or affluent journalists” (Kristol 173). Along 
similar lines, Seymour Martin Lipset also emphasized how the 
“ideological slope” of American academia was consistently toward 
radicalism, to a point where college professors were “well to the left” 
of even “the main body of college graduates,” never mind the bulk of 
working and middle class Americans (Lipsett and Ladd 112, 109;  
emphasis in original). But if race and poverty were the issues of the 
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day, neoconservatives applied the same analysis to virtually every 
aspect of public policy, from health care to crime and the 
environment, and ever since have insisted on the need to channel 
public funds through “private, group, voluntary and non state” 
organizations,” which they believe are closer to the actual beneficiary 
and therefore more efficient and less prone to generate unintended 
negative effects (Glazer “Paradoxes” 82; Kristol Two Cheers 30). 
Again, the same arguments are regularly reproduced and found in 
21st-century American politics: Donald Trump’s “swamp,” for 
instance, is certainly made up of politicians and lobbyists, but it also 
contains the dastardly members of the “deep state” (not 
coincidentally conflated with “the left” and “the fake media2), which 
turns out to be just a new term for, as we has seen, a very old trope 
(as quoted in Sevastopoulo). Similarly, onetime Trump ideological 
Svengali Steve Bannon’s oft-repeated need to “deconstruct the 
administrative state” harked back to those late 1960s and early 
1970s neoconservative criticisms of the, according to them, bloated, 
self-serving and counterproductive Great Society (Rucker and Costa). 
It is however important to emphasize that neoconservative 
hostility towards the negative aspects of the Great Society never 
quite provoked a conversion to the traditional American 
conservatism represented by the campaign of the 1964 Republican 
candidate Barry Goldwater. Traditionalist conservatives, such as 
writers Russell Kirk and James Burnham, abhorred “modernity” to 
the point of denouncing the emergence of sociology (Kirk thought the 
radio and the electric bulb were also suspect), and instead hankered 
after an idealized image of a rural, pre-modern past. 
Neoconservatives however, far from attacking the social sciences or 
technological advances per se, were professionally engaged in “public 
service” sciences and had a less guarded take on scientific progress 
(Kass 18-27; Wills 46-48; Nash, 176–183). Furthermore, 
neoconservatives always realized that traditionalist conservatives 
tended to be too “aristocratic” and, more specifically “British-like,” 
and hence had a relatively narrow appeal to Americans. They 
therefore self-consciously aimed at generating arguments more 
closely attuned to the American public: instead of looking back to an 
idealized Middle Age, neoconservatives defended a revival of the 
considerably more familiar 1950’s, a decade described in 
Commentary as “an oasis of stability and rationality in Western 
affairs” (Mander 64; Norman Podhoretz “Telephone”). Similarly, 
unlike neoclassical liberals, neoconservatives never pursued a 
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“minimal state” nor disputed the need for public policymaking as 
such. In fact, neoconservatives proposed a relatively paternalistic 
and authoritarian state ready to provide assistance for the needy and 
willing to actively protect certain “traditional” values. As Kristol 
expressed in one of his famous dictums, neoconservatives were only 
willing to proclaim “two cheers” for capitalism (Kristol (c) ix-x). In 
more pragmatic terms, neoconservatives also recognized very early 
on that any proposal to dismantle the welfare state was likely to 
become political suicide. And politicians, they knew, were vital to the 
exercise of power and influence (Kristol 212, 282; Podhoretz 
“Telephone”). Thus, in response to the collapse of Keynesian 
economics, neoconservatives did not offer the recipe of monetarism 
sponsored by most neoliberal economists and conventional American 
conservatives alike, but so-called supply-side economics (later taken 
up by Ronald Reagan), which seemed to offer the possibility of 
maintaining a certain level of government services while preventing 
unwanted expansion by reducing taxes (Wanniski; Stein 237 - 249). 
Half a century later, the exact same model of authoritarian, 
paternalistic state combined with business-friendly overtures and tax 
cuts for the wealthier segments of society is back in the Oval Office. 
Minus, it cannot possibly be over-emphasized, the technical know-
how and expertise. What for neoconservatives was policy, for Donald 
Trump has become mere political advertising.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Despite the obvious detestation that the leading 
neoconservatives of the 21st century show towards the rightwing 
populism of Donald Trump (Yglesias; Heilbrunn), neither the 
President nor neoconservatives have been able to escape one 
another. Besides technical expertise, the enduring relevance of 
neoconservatives themselves and the importance of the 
neoconservative critique has been magnified and prolonged over time 
by two other phenomena that emerged after the 1960s. Firstly, 
Keynesian economics suffered a grave crisis that resulted in 
prolonged stagflation, which combined with the evident lack of 
solutions offered by Keynesian economists opened the door to the 
then less orthodox conservative proposals such as supply-side and 
“trickle down” economics (Stedman Jones 254-272), which were 
eventually adopted by Ronald Reagan. Secondly and most 
importantly, neoconservatives have consistently shown a remarkable 
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willingness to accommodate the populist wing of the American right. 
As the American electorate sent Richard Nixon to the White House, 
the 1968 presidential race also saw the enormous national success 
of George Wallace, the former Governor of Alabama best known for 
having defended “segregation yesterday, segregation today, 
segregation forever” (Carter 88, 96). Wallace’s success running a 
campaign based on a populist defense of traditional values, law and 
order and quite open racism propelled Nixon and his White House 
further to the right and reflected the fact that, whatever the views of 
the intelligentsia and the young, the electorate was manifesting its 
exhaustion with the perceived demands of racial minorities and the 
changes imposed by the counterculture (Scammon and Wattenberg; 
Phillips “Emerging”).  
  Neoconservatives, needless to say, fully realized (and much 
celebrated) this change of public mood, but it was a group of young 
conservative activists who, headed by Richard Viguerie, Paul 
Weyrich, Morton Blackwell and Howard Phillips, organized the birth 
of the so-called New Right in the early 1970’s (Wilson and Wilde; 
Hacker ). Unlike neoconservatism, the New Right adopted a clearly 
populist strategy aimed at capturing the growing conservatism of the 
electorate and managed to enlist, with the priceless collaboration of 
the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision, the support of Reverend 
Jerry Fallwell and his, until then apolitical, evangelical conservative 
movement. It is important to note that, although neoconservatives 
were increasingly influenced by religious views, the behavior of the 
New Right differed greatly from the considerably more elitist 
neoconservatives, who never created or even tried to mobilize a 
popular mass base (Peele 51). From their new bases in think-tanks 
such as the American Enterprise Institute and the California-based 
Hoover Institution, the neoconservatives’ proposals gained 
considerably more weight than anyone could have expected in an 
electoral atmosphere increasingly loaded with rising conservatism. It 
is therefore no surprise that neoconservatives, although retaining 
most of their self-conscious elitism, chose to “not worry” about (and 
rather welcome) the “new populism” of the Christian Right, while the 
political leaders of the New Right remained quite sympathetic to 
neoconservative spokespeople (Kristol 359; Podhoretz “Telephone”, 
Phillips; Blackwell; Keene). Both groups had an enormous impact in 
helping to modernize the message of an American conservative 
movement that was, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, in severe 
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danger of losing touch with its own grass roots. Neoconservatives 
contributed to making the transition from a movement focused on 
issues such as Civil Rights and anti-communism towards a 
conservatism increasingly capable of connecting those issues with a 
message ostensibly centered on fighting the cultural wars that have 
marked American politics for the last half century (Judis, 342; 
Blackwell; Keene). 
In short, the 1960s and early 1970s bequeathed incoming 
generations a world in which neoconservatism became the 
intellectual spearhead of rightwing political action. To this day, 
politics and policymaking retain a potent neoconservative flair, which 
must be added to the considerable vigor of neoconservative principles 
in the enduring cultural wars still coloring American public life. 
When asked to what period he wanted to take American back to 
make it great “again,” Trump resuscitated the neoconservative 
affection and romanticizing of the by now mythical “50s” (Krieg; 
Sanger and Haberman). As a journalist reminded the delegates to 
the 2016 Republican convention, this was a period when General 
Dwight Eisenhower was indeed in the White House, but was also 
when women happened to be subordinated inside the home and 
racial minorities (notably African Americans) were firmly within their 
separated and emphatically unequal social and political roles. Once 
reminded of these not so minor historical nuances, the 
aforementioned delegates swiftly shifted their assessment of an 
idyllic past from the 1950s to Reagan’s 1980s, which were also a 
high point of neoconservative influence (Newton-Small). President 
Trump, however, has remained firm in both his purported principles 
and, most importantly, in his message. 
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